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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Matthew Elliot Cohagan challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress 
evidence seized after a Nampa police officer illegally detained him.  The district court 
erroneously concluded that, although Officer Curtis unlawfully seized Mr. Cohagan, the 
evidence against him was sufficiently attenuated from that illegality and thus did not warrant 
suppression.  In response, the State argues that Mr. Cohagan was never unlawfully detained 
(despite having conceded as much below), and that, even if he was unlawfully detained, the 
district court correctly found the evidence against Mr. Cohagan was attenuated from the illegal 
detention.  The State’s arguments rely on a misunderstanding of the legal principles at issue in 
this case.  In fact, the reasoning of Utah v. Strieff, No. 14-1373, 2016 WL 3369419 (U.S. 
June 20, 2016), which the U.S. Supreme Court decided after the State filed its respondent’s brief, 
shows as much.  This reply addresses the State’s belated attempt to rescind its concession that 
Mr. Cohagan was seized when Officer Curtis retained his license, its mischaracterization of the 
first factor in the attenuation analysis, its attempt to minimize the flagrancy of Officer Curtis’s 
conduct, and the guidance provided by Strieff.   
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Cohagan’s motion to suppress because the evidence 
seized was the direct result of the illegal detention? 
 
 3 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Cohagan’s Motion To Suppress Because The 
Evidence Seized Was The Direct Result Of The Illegal Detention 
 
A. The District Court Correctly Found, And The State Below Appropriately Conceded, That 
Officer Curtis Unlawfully Detained Mr. Cohagan 
 
The State argues that the district court erroneously concluded, and the State below 
erroneously conceded, that Officer Curtis unlawfully detained Mr. Cohagan.  (Resp. Br., pp.7–
11; see also R., pp.49–51, 65.)  The State’s belated attempt to argue as much is both improper 
and incorrect. 
  
1. The State Cannot Rescind Its Unequivocal Concession That Officer Curtis 
Unlawfully Detained Mr. Cohagan By Retaining His License To Run A Warrant 
Check    
 
A party cannot raise an issue on appeal if it “forfeited the argument by its own 
affirmative assertions, concessions, and acquiescence in the course of the litigation.”  State v. 
Hanson, 142 Idaho 711, 717 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 
208–209 (1981)).  This is particularly true when the concession relieved the other party of the 
need to meet its evidentiary burden on a particular issue.  State v. Marshall, 149 Idaho 725, 727 
(Ct. App. 2008) (in which the State had the burden of proving that a probationer had been 
discharged from probation, but the defendant’s concession relieved the State of that burden). 
The State below unequivocally conceded that there was a seizure.  (R., p.51 (the State’s 
response to Mr. Cohagan’s motion to suppress, which states: “Here, the State concedes that the 
defendant was unjustifiably seized at the point Officer Curtis chose to retain his license and hold 
it while running the defendant’s information for active warrants.”); 5/6/14 Tr., p.7, Ls.3–10, 
p.38, Ls.17–19 (“we admit holding the ID was probably a seizure; we do admit that”), p.39, 
Ls.11–13 (“Now as I indicated, the state admits that once the officer has that ID, under the law 
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that is a seizure.”), p.65 (the district court stating that “[i]t is undisputed that the officers’ 
conduct in this case created an unlawful detention.”).  Therefore, the State cannot turn around 
and contend, for the first time on appeal, that there was no seizure.  See Hanson, 142 Idaho at 
717.  Importantly, by conceding that point, the State relieved Mr. Cohagan of his burden of 
proving he was seized.  See Marshall, 149 Idaho at 727; 5/6/14 Tr., p.7, Ls.3–10 (defense 
counsel explaining, “I think they have acknowledged that there was some kind of unlawful 
detention.  So I think we’ve shifted the burden to the state to justify that detention.  And so, I 
would assume the state is prepared to move forward with calling witnesses,” to which the State 
said, “that’s correct, Your Honor”).  Absent that concession, Mr. Cohagan could have provided 
evidence and argument regarding the illegal detention, and the district court would have had the 
chance to make the factual findings necessary to decide that issue.  For an appellate court to 
overlook the State’s concession and act as a finder of fact on appeal would erode the distinction 
between trial and appellate courts.  It would also destroy the purpose of concessions by requiring 
parties to unnecessarily present evidence and argument on every possible issue, regardless of 
whether it was actually in dispute.   
For those reasons, the State’s reliance on State v. Veneroso, 138 Idaho 925, 930 (Ct. App. 
2003), for the proposition that this Court is not “‘limited by the prosecutor’s argument or the 
absence thereof’” is misplaced.  (Resp. Br., p.7.)  In Veneroso, the State failed to assert the 
automobile exception to the warrant requirement below, but on appeal the Court of Appeals 
decided that the automobile exception applied.  Veneroso, 138 Idaho at 930.  Although it appears 
that the prosecutor in Veneroso acknowledged that the automobile exception may not apply, 
see id. (“the state indicated that the automobile exception probably would not apply under the 
facts of this case”), the State here clearly conceded that Mr. Cohagan was unlawfully detained 
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and instead focused its argument on the attenuation doctrine (5/6/14 Tr., p.7, Ls.3–10, p.38, 
Ls.17–19, p.39, Ls.11–13).  Additionally, in Veneroso it was the State’s burden to prove an 
exception to the warrant requirement, Veneroso, 138 Idaho at 929, while here it was 
Mr. Cohagan’s burden to show a seizure occurred, see State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843 (2004).1  
Because the State’s concession relieved Mr. Cohagan of that burden and allowed the court to 
conclude there was a seizure without considering any arguments to the contrary, the State cannot 
argue for the first time on appeal that there was no seizure. 
   
2. The State Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erroneously Concluded 
That Officer Curtis Unlawfully Detained Mr. Cohagan 
 
The State first acknowledges that “Page noted its prior decisions holding that ‘a limited 
detention does occur when an officer retains a driver’s license or other paperwork of value.’”  
(Resp. Br., p.10 n.1 (quoting Page, 140 Idaho at 457).)  Yet the State argues that this case is 
distinguishable because in Page, “the officer retained Page’s identification and returned to his 
patrol car,” while here “Officer Curtis did not take [Mr.] Cohagan’s license and return to his 
patrol car.”  (Id.)  Mr. Cohagan fails to see how that fact matters.  The holding in Page was in no 
way tied to the officer walking back to his patrol car—it rested entirely on the officer retaining 
the defendant’s license.  Page, 140 Idaho at 457 (“This Court has previously held that a limited 
detention does occur when an officer retains a driver’s license or other paperwork of value.”) 
(emphasis added).   
                                            
1 Similarly, the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 112 (2013), 
is not on point.  There the Court held that it had an independent duty to determine “whether the 
facts adduced at the suppression hearing justified the traffic stop,” even though the State 
conceded as much below.  Id.  In Morgan, like Veneroso and unlike here, that burden was on the 
State. 
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Along those same lines, the State mistakenly argues that Mr. Cohagan was not seized 
because he “could have just easily asked for his license back.”  (Resp. Br., p.10).  True, 
Mr. Cohagan could have asked for his license back.  But so could the defendant in Page, as 
could any other individual whose license the police had retained (except perhaps in the unusual 
situation in which the officer actually leaves the scene with the person’s identification).  Whether 
Mr. Cohagan could have asked for his license back is thus of no consequence.  What matters is 
that he would have had to ask for his license back in the first place, and Officer Curtis would 
have had to give it back, before Mr. Cohagan would be free to leave.   
The State also overlooks that here, unlike in Page, the officers already knew who 
Mr. Cohagan was before asking for his license the second time.  Officer Otto asked Mr. Cohagan 
for his identification just minutes before (R., p.58), and Officer Curtis testified that, before he 
asked for Mr. Cohagan’s license, he already realized Mr. Cohagan was not Milo Morgan as he 
had initially thought.  (5/6/14 Tr., p.28, Ls.2–12.)  It is therefore indisputable that Officer Curtis 
could have run a warrant check without requesting and holding onto Mr. Cohagan’s license.  
(See R., p.65 (the district court stating that “[t]here does not appear to be any reason that the 
officers could not have run a warrant check and confirmed the existence of the arrest warrant 
outside of the grocery store and before they made contact with the defendant.”)  The only 
purpose of doing so was to keep Mr. Cohagan present until the officers heard back from 
dispatch.  These facts get to the heart of the concern in Page: 
This Court is concerned about the implications of a rule allowing law enforcement 
officers the ability to initiate consensual encounters with pedestrians in order to 
seize identification and run a warrants check.  Twenty-five years ago the United 
States Supreme Court made clear the general rule that in the absence of any basis 
for suspecting an individual of misconduct, the Fourth Amendment generally does 
not allow government agents to detain an individual and demand identification.   
 
Page, 140 Idaho at 845 (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) (emphasis added)). 
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Finally, the State speculates that Mr. Cohagan did not feel detained because he asked 
Officer Curtis if he could go get formula while Officer Curtis ran the warrant check.  (Resp. 
Br., p.9)  Contrary to the State’s claim, the fact that Mr. Cohagan asked Officer Curtis for 
permission, and did not simply demand his license back and then leave, shows Mr. Cohagan did 
not “‘feel free to disregard the police and go about his business.’”  Page, 140 Idaho at 843–44 
(quoting State v. Nickel, 134 Idaho 610, 613 (2000)).  The State’s argument also fails to account 
for, or even acknowledge, the affidavit Mr. Cohagan submitted in support of his motion.  
(R., pp.57–59.)  Mr. Cohagan explained:  
5. Even though [Officer Otto] “requested” that I provide him with 
identification, I did not feel like I could refuse to comply.  At that point I 
felt seized even though I was in a public place.  I believed that if I refused 
he would have further restrained me by putting handcuffs on me.  
6. The officer looked at my identification, returned it to me, and then left.  
7. A few minutes later, while still shopping in Albertson’s, another officer 
approached me.  He asked me my name.  I gave him my name and 
explained the encounter with the officer a few minutes prior.  
8. The second officer asked me for my identification. Because I had 
explained what had happened yet the officer still requested to see my 
identification, I felt that I was seized again and simply could not ignore 
him or leave the store.  Consequently, I handed him my identification.  
9. At no time during my contact with either officer did I feel that my 
interactions with them were consensual.  In other words, I did not believe 
that I could simply ignore them or leave.  
 
(R., p.58.)   
Finally, the State argues that the first time Officer Curtis seized Mr. Cohagan was after 
dispatch said he may have a warrant out, which gave Officer Curtis the ability to detain him until 
the warrant was confirmed or dispelled.  (Resp. Br., pp.10–11.)  The case the State cites for that 
proposition, State v. Law, 115 Idaho 769 (Ct. App. 1989), is not on point.  Law held that an 
officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a car “for the investigative purpose of determining 
whether it was being driven by the registered owner, Roger Law, an unlicensed driver wanted on 
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a bench warrant.”  Id. at 771.  This case presents the opposite situation—the officers knew who 
Mr. Cohagan was, but did not know whether he had a warrant out.  Mr. Cohagan is unaware of 
any case deciding whether the unconfirmed possibility of a warrant amounts to reasonable 
suspicion, but he contends the mere possibility of a warrant did not amount to reasonable 
suspicion to justify his continued detention.  In short, the State below appropriately conceded, 
and the district court correctly concluded, that Mr. Cohagan was unlawfully seized when Officer 
Curtis asked for and retained his license to run a warrant check. 
     
B. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Cohagan’s Motion To Suppress Because 
The Evidence Seized Was The Direct Result Of The Illegal Detention 
 
As an initial matter, it is worth repeating that, once a defendant makes a showing that the 
evidence to be suppressed was casually connected to the illegal state action, the burden shifts to 
the State to show that the unlawful conduct did not taint the evidence.  State v. Cardenas, 
143 Idaho 903, 908–09 (Ct. App. 2006).  The State here failed to make that showing. 
   
1. Contrary To The State’s Claim, The Relevant Time Period With Respect To The 
First Attenuation Factor Is Not From The Misconduct To The Point At Which 
There Was A Lawful Basis For The Police Action 
 
As for the first attenuation factor—the length of time between the misconduct and the 
acquisition of the evidence—the State claims that the relevant time period is between the illegal 
action and the point at which there was a lawful basis for the police action, and that the short 
lapse of time here favors attenuation.  (Resp. Br., pp.11–17.)  Both arguments fall flat, especially 
in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Utah v. Strieff, No. 14-1373, 2016 WL 
3369419 (U.S. June 20, 2016).  
First, the State explains that “[a]s illustrated in Green and Reynolds, while the time factor 
of the attenuation test has been phrased in terms of the lapse ‘between the misconduct and the 
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acquisition of the evidence’ Page, supra, in application this factor considers the time between the 
misconduct and the point at which there was a lawful basis for the police action.”  (Resp. 
Br., p.16.)  The State’s conclusions regarding United States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515, 521 (7th Cir. 
1997), ignore not just the test set forth in that case (“the time elapsed between the illegality and 
the acquisition of the evidence”), but also the analysis (“only about five minutes elapsed between 
the illegal stop of the Greens and the search of the car.  This weighs against finding the search 
attenuated.”).  (See Resp. Br., pp.14–16.)  Instead, the State’s arguments on Green focus on the 
presence of intervening circumstances, which is a factor separate and apart from the lapse of 
time.  See Page, 140 Idaho at 846. “(1) the elapsed time between the misconduct and the 
acquisition of the evidence, (2) the occurrence of intervening circumstances, and (3) the 
flagrancy and purpose of the improper law enforcement action.”) (emphasis added).  The State’s 
proposed analysis thus conflates the first and second parts of the test.  
In any event, the State has failed to account for the origin of this test—the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Brown v. Texas, 422 U.S. 590 (1975.)  Brown clearly stated that courts 
should consider “[t]he temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession.”  Id. at 603; see also 
id. at 604 (“Brown’s first statement was separated from his illegal arrest by less than two hours, 
. . . [a]nd the second statement was clearly the result and the fruit of the first.”).  If Brown left 
any doubt, Streiff did not:  “[W]e look to the ‘temporal proximity between the unconstitutional 
conduct and the discovery of evidence . . . .”  Strieff, 2016 WL 3369419, at *5 (emphasis added).  
Decisions which consider a time period different from that set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in Brown, and reaffirmed in Strieff, are incorrect .2 
                                            
2 The State’s assertion that State v. Reynolds, 146 Idaho 466 (Ct. App. 2008), considered the time 
between the police misconduct and the third party’s consent, rather than the discovery of the 
evidence as a result of that consent, is well taken.  (See Resp. Br., pp.13–14.)  And, as discussed 
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Finally, the State argues that a short lapse of time favors attenuation when the intervening 
circumstance is an outstanding warrant, while a longer lapse of time favors attenuation when the 
intervening circumstance is consent.  (Resp. Br., p.17.)  Strieff directly undercuts the State’s 
position.  The intervening circumstance there was an arrest warrant, but the Court still concluded 
that the lapse of time—a few minutes—favored attenuation.   Strieff, 2016 WL 3369419, at *6.  
The Court explained:  “Our precedents have declined to find that this factor favors attenuation 
unless ‘substantial time’ elapses between an unlawful act and when the evidence is obtained.”  
Strieff, 2016 WL 3369419, at *6 (citing Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 633 (2003) (per curiam)).  
The State’s suggestion that a shorter lapse of time favors attenuation when the intervening 
circumstance is an arrest warrant is baseless; the short lapse of time here cuts against attenuation. 
   
2. The State’s Argument Regarding The Third Attenuation Factor—The Flagrancy 
And Purpose Of The Improper Law Enforcement Action—Is Divorced From The 
Facts Of This Case 
 
The State first appears to assert that the district court’s erroneous factual finding—which 
the State frames as “the district court’s statement about Officer Curtis’ testimony”—was 
supported by the evidence.  (Resp. Br., p.18 (emphasis added).)  The State explains that “Officer 
Curtis did testify about his belief that [Mr.] Cohagan was Morgan, and he advised Mr. Cohogan 
of that fact when he made contact with him in the grocery store.”  (Id.)  True.  But that does not 
change the fact that Officer Curtis testified that, though he initially thought Mr. Cohagan may 
have been Milo Morgan, he realized Mr. Cohagan was not Milo Morgan as he approached 
Mr. Cohagan in the grocery store.  (5/6/14 Tr., p.28, Ls.2–12.)  Nor does it change the fact that 
                                                                                                                                            
in the Appellant’s Brief, Page set forth the correct time period—the lapse of time between the 
misconduct and the acquisition of evidence—but then failed to consider that time period in its 
analysis.  (App. Br., p.10 n.3.)  Those decisions are incorrect according to Brown and Strieff.    
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the court completely overlooked that testimony when deciding this issue.  The court explained, 
“[a]s to the flagrancy and purpose of the improper law enforcement action, Officer Curtis 
testified extensively that the individual resembled another suspect who he knew had an 
outstanding arrest warrant.”  (R., p.66.)  In other words, the court found that Officer Curtis had a 
benign reason to stop Mr. Cohagan for the second time because Officer Curtis believed 
Mr. Cohagan was really Milo Morgan.  But, according to Officer Curtis himself, “I realized it 
was not him, but at that point I still wanted to ask his name and ID him.”  (5/6/14 Tr., p.28, Ls.2–
12.)  Officer Curtis already knew Mr. Cohagan’s name and Officer Otto had already looked at 
Mr. Cohagan’s identification, so Officer Curtis could have run a warrant check without again 
asking for and retaining Mr. Cohagan’s license.  By first asking for Mr. Cohagan’s license, 
Officer Curtis ensured he could arrest Mr. Cohagan on the spot if Mr. Cohagan ended up having 
a warrant out.    
Finally, the State’s argument on this issue relies on the mistaken premise that this was a 
“consensual encounter” and lawful detention.  (Resp. Br., pp.18–19.)  As conceded by the State 
below (R., pp.49–51), found by the district court (R., p.65), and explained by Mr. Cohagan above 
(see supra, pp.5–8), he was unlawfully detained when Officer Curtis retained his license.  Again, 
the only purpose for asking for Mr. Cohagan’s license the second time around, and then holding 
onto it while running a warrant check, was to be able to arrest him on the spot. 
   
3. Officer’s Curtis’s Conduct Was Precisely The “Fishing Expedition” Strieff 
Condemned, And Thus Strieff Stands Against A Finding Of Attenuation In This 
Case 
 
Both in Strieff and here, the first factor cuts against attenuation while the second factor 
favors attenuation.  Therefore, this case comes down to the third “particularly significant” 
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factor—the purpose and flagrancy of the misconduct.  Strieff, 2016 WL 3369419, at *5 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
The Strieff Court concluded that the officer there had not acted purposefully or flagrantly.  
Strieff, 2016 WL 3369419, at *7–8.  After getting an anonymous tip reporting drug activity at a 
house and then watching the house for about a week, the officer in Strieff believed that the 
occupants were selling drugs.  Strieff, 2016 WL 3369419, at *3.  The officer stopped Strieff after 
he left the home, asked what he was doing there, got his identification, and ran a warrants check.  
Strieff, 2016 WL 3369419, at *3.  The officer arrested Strieff when he learned that he had an 
outstanding warrant, and found drugs during a search incident to arrest.  Strieff, 2016 WL 
3369419, at *3.   
The Strieff Court described the officer as negligent, but concluded that “these errors in 
judgment hardly rise to a purposeful or flagrant violation of Strieff’s Fourth Amendment rights.”  
Strieff, 2016 WL 3369419, at *7.  The Court reiterated that “Officer Fackrell saw Strieff leave a 
suspected drug house.  And his suspicion about the house was based on an anonymous tip and 
his personal observations.”  Strieff, 2016 WL 3369419, at *8.  Therefore, the Court rejected the 
notion that this was “a suspicionless fishing expedition in the hope that something would turn 
up.”  Strieff, 2016 WL 3369419, at *8 (internal citations omitted).  Because this factor tipped the 
balance in favor of attenuation, the Court held that the evidence should not be suppressed.  
Strieff, 2016 WL 3369419, at *9. 
Officer Curtis’s conduct in this case, on the other hand, was nothing more than a fishing 
expedition.  When Officer Curtis approached Mr. Cohagan, Officer Otto had already asked 
Mr. Cohagan for his license and determined that Mr. Cohagan was not Milo Morgan.  (R., p.58.)  
When Officer Curtis approached Mr. Cohogan the second time, Officer Curtis “realized it was 
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not him, but at that point [he] still wanted to ask his name and ID him.”  (5/6/14 Tr., p.28, Ls.2–
12.)  Unlike Strieff, there was no “bona fide investigation” underway.  Strieff, 2016 WL 
3369419, at *8.  Officer Curtis had absolutely no legitimate reason to stop Mr. Cohagan and ask 
for his license (for a second time), or to hold on to it while running a warrants check.  The only 
possible reason for doing that was “the hope that something would turn up”—precisely the kind 
of conduct condemned by Strieff.  Strieff, 2016 WL 3369419, at *8.  Officer Curtis’s fishing 
expedition amounted to a knowing, flagrant disregard of Mr. Cohagan’s Fourth Amendment 
rights.  This factor tips the balance against a finding of attenuation, and thus the evidence seized 
incident to arrest must be suppressed. 
     
CONCLUSION 
Officer Curtis unlawfully seized Mr. Cohagan when he asked for and retained 
Mr. Cohagan’s license so that he could run a warrant check with Mr. Cohagan present.  The 
evidence against Mr. Cohagan was a direct result of that Fourth Amendment violation and must 
be suppressed.  Mr. Cohagan respectfully requests that the Court vacate his judgment of 
conviction and reverse the order denying his motion to suppress. 
 DATED this 12th day of July, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      MAYA P. WALDRON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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